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Abstract
The recognition of corporate governance as a consequential aspect for adequate investor protection
and the development of both capital markets and the economy as a whole, the fundamental differ-
ences between governance arrangements that seem useful to controlled and widely held companies,
and how to deal with such matters in view of the increasing use of private regulatory measures
form the cornerstone of this article. This article draws on an example of the private regulation of
takeovers in Brazil and argues that regulation of the capital market, be its origin public or private,
must pay attention to the corporate ownership structures that dominate the jurisdiction in which
the rules are to be applied. The alignment of corporate governance private regulatory measures
with the public interest is argued to be fostered once one duly considers that corporate governance
arrangements work differently in environments of concentrated or dispersed ownership structures.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that international economic governance nowadays involves not
only states and international organizations but also private actors, whose activity as norm-
makers has been gaining importance over the years.' Although significant in terms of the
number of fields regulated and its efficacy, the role played by private regulation, however,
is not always aligned with the public interest. The possible disconnection of such regula-
tion from public policies raises questions in terms of the accountability and the legitimacy
of such private regimes.
* Ph.D., University of Sgo Paulo, Brazil. Attorney at law in S-o Paulo. Former Max Weber Postdoctoral
Fellow, European University Institute. I am grateful to the Max Weber Programme for Postdoctoral Studies
for supporting this research. An earlier version of this article was presented as a MWP Working Paper.
1. See Jan M. Smits, Maastricht-HiiL Chair on the Internationalisation of Law, Hague Inst. for the In-
ternationalisation of Law, Private Law 2.0: On the Role of Private Actors in a Post-National Society 11 (Nov.
30, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=1779042.
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This is a matter of concern in the international arena when one talks about transna-
tional private regulation, but its importance should not be undermined in national do-
mains either. This assertion will be made clear by the case study presented here, which
refers to the regulation of corporate control transactions in Brazil.2
As in many continental European countries, concentrated control is the most common
ownership structure among listed corporations in Brazil.3 Nevertheless, it has recently
been argued that this scenario is undergoing important changes, especially due to the so-
called "Novo Mercado," a segment of the Sio Paulo Stock Exchange (named
BM&FBovespa).4 Companies listed on the Novo Mercado must comply with higher stan-
dards of corporate governance practices, one of which is to issue common shares exclu-
sively.S After being restrained from issuing preferred shares, it becomes much more
expensive to acquire or keep full control of a company. Therefore, there is an incentive
for the emergence of wider corporate ownership structures.
The shy, but persistent, moves towards ownership dispersion raises the possibility of
hostile takeovers taking place, which was non-existent until recently due to the high levels
of ownership concentration. The absence of rules specifically aimed at dealing with the
matter, such as those found in American state takeover laws6 or in the European Takeover
Directive, 7 left space for private regulation. The mere presence of private regulation is
not considered per se problematic, especially because the Brazilian capital market is used
to self-regulatory measures, and the Novo Mercado is a successful example. The problem is
that private takeover regulation has proven to be deceptive, as explained in detail below,
and does not work in the public interest of fostering the market by protecting investors.
This illustrates the challenges posed by private regulatory regimes and the need for
coordination between these regimes and public policies. The Brazilian example will show
how even an environment characterized by a healthy self-regulatory scheme may suffer
2. For purposes of this article, "corporate control transactions" means the transaction between the com-
pany's shareholders and a person who aims to acquire a certain number of the target company's shares that
allows him or her to exercise control power over a Brazilian company. Brazil's Corporate Law defines a
controlling shareholder as a shareholder who (i) holds the ownership of shares that permanently assures the
holder of a majority of votes in shareholders' meetings and the power to elect a majority of the members of
the management, and (ii) actually uses such power to direct the corporate activities and to guide the opera-
tions of the company. Lei No. 6,404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, DIAiPo ORcIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U.l de
17.12.1976, art. 116 (Braz.).
3. For empirical research, see Andre Carvalhal da-Silva & Ricardo P.C. Leal, Corporate Governance, Market
Valuation and Dividend Policy in Brazil 2-3 (Coppead Working Paper Series, Paper No. 390, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssm.coin/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=477302; Eduardo Schiehll & Igor Oliveira dos Santos,
Ownership Structure and Composition of Boards of Directors: Evidence on Brazilian Publicly-Traded Companies, 39
REVISTA DE ADMINSITRA AO DA UNIVERSIDADE DE SAO PAULO IADMIN. J. SAO PAULO U.] 373, 377 (2004)
(Braz.); Ricardo P.C. Leal & Andre Carvalhal-da-Silva, Corporate Governance and Value in Brazil (and in Chile)
1 (Inter-American Development Bank, Latin American Research Network, Working Paper No. R-514,
2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=726261.
4. Erica Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership:
Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for Emerging Countries, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 439, 447 (2009).
5. Corporate Governance, BM&FBovEsPA, http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-us/markets/equities/compa-
nies/corporate-govemance.aspx?idioma=en-us (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
6. See Richard Hall, United States Takeover Guide, IN''L BAR Ass'N (May 12, 2009), http://www.ibanet.
org/Search/Default.aspx?q=takeover% 20guide.
7. Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids,
2004 O.J. (L 142/12).
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from inefficiencies in terms of lack of adequate attention to the multiple affected stake-
holders. It will also indicate the importance of regulating corporate governance matters-
either through public or private means-with a view towards the specific ownership struc-
tures in place in a given market.
In view of the above, this article is structured as follows: Section I broadly addresses the
emergence of private corporate governance regulatory regimes in the transnational arena
and the necessity of their interaction with the state. Section II briefly evokes arguments
on the importance of aligning corporate measures to the ownership structures of public
companies and uses the example of the regulation of corporate control transactions. Sec-
tion III explains the Brazilian rules on control negotiations, puts forward the challenges
posed by the emergence of widely held companies, and explores the emergence of private
regulation on the subject, which is mainly influenced by certain foreign regulations. Sec-
tion IV draws on the importance of the relationship between the corporate governance
tools and the corporate ownership structure, explains the inadequacy of the aforemen-
tioned private takeover regulation, and considers ways in which to synchronize the suc-
cessful example of self-regulation in the Brazilian capital market legal system with the
public interest of promoting a trustworthy capital market.
I. The Rise of Corporate Governance Private Regulation as a Transnational
Feature and the Role of the State
The privatization of norm-making capacities has become increasingly common among
regulatory initiatives on corporate governance. Accompanying the lack of frontiers of cor-
porate activity, the proliferation of transnational corporate governance codes, codes of
conduct, standards, rules, and codes of best practices raises questions as to the classifica-
tion of such documents as law or norms with binding force. 8
Sometimes considered a consequence of globalization, the transfer of public functions
to corporate actors is a reality in various fields, including financial, corporate governance,
and environmental regulation.9 Assumed to be a result of the extensively mentioned in-
ability of the state to deal with matters that go beyond its specific territory, corporations
create rules and fulfill important regulatory roles even in the absence of a mandate from
public authorities. This use of self-regulation as a norm-making procedure brings about
theoretical questions in terms of the validity, democratic legitimacy,' 0 completeness, and
8. Peer Zumbansen, 'New Governance' in European Corporate Law Regulation as Transnational Legal Plural-
ism, 15 EUR. L.J. 246, 253-54 (2009); Michael Torrance, Persuasive Authority Beyond the State: A Theoretical
Analysis of Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility Norms as Legal Reasons Within Positive Legal Systems, 12
GER. LJ. 1573, 1573-74 (2008) (investigating if transnational normative systems may be considered part of
positive legal systems); see also Joanna Benjamin & David Rouch, The International Financial Markets as a
Source of Global Law: The Privatisation of Rule-Making?, 2 L. & FIN. MARKETS REv. 78, 80 (2008) (arguing
that refusing to consider private regulation as law would indicate the adoption of a formal definition of the
term instead of a ftnctionalist one).
9. See e.g., Martin Herberg, Global Legal Pluralism and Interlegality: Environmental Self-Regulation in Mul-
tinational Enterprises as Global Law-Making, in RESPONSIBLE BUsINESS - SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMic TRANsACTIoNs 16, 17-18 (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter eds.,
2008); Benjamin & Rouch, supra note 8, at 80.
10. A. Claire Cuter, Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in THE FMERGENCE OF PRI-
VATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 32-33 (Rodney B. Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002);
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enforcement of such norms that is aggravated by the possibility of a de-territorialized and
informal process of norm production."
This is one facet of the so-called private global norm-production, 12 or, more recently,
transnational private regulation,1 3 which accounts for sets of rules, codes, practices, stan-
dards, and similar frameworks created by non-state actors who exercise regulatory author-
ity that may, or may not, have been previously awarded to them by international or
national law.' 4 The emergence of transnational norm production reflects a change in the
regulatory environment, in which private actors gain importance and play fundamental
roles and where rules are formed by both hard and soft law.
The norms on corporate governance are among the most famous forms of transnational
private regulation.'S The recent proliferation of corporate governance codes, both in na-
tional and transnational arenas, 16 indicates the diversity of norm-setting processes and
actors. Corporate governance codes usually embrace a production of norms that do not
necessarily account for domestic territories, especially with regard to business activities,
which, in a globalized world, are no longer restricted to national borders.
The modification of the style of regulation is, in part, related to the globalization of
corporate governance. The prominence of the subject on a worldwide basis, along with
the integration of markets and the activity of multinational corporations as global players,
facilitated the emergence of private norm-setting in an arena that is not defined by state
boundaries. Reflected in an increasingly noticeable private regulation, this change repre-
sents a challenge for governments but not necessarily a lack of importance of the state.' 7
see Carola Glinski, Bridging the Gap: The Legal Potential of Private Regulation, in RESPONSIBLE BUsINESS, supra
note 9, at 41, 43 (fair and pluralistic decision-making procedures are pointed as substitutes for the lack of
democracy in the private regulation); Julia Black & David Rouch, The Development of the Global Markets as
Rule-Makers: Engagement and Legitimacy, 2 L. & FIN. MARKETs REv. 218, 223-27 (2008) (addressing legiti-
macy criteria for private regulation).
11. Grailf-Peter Calliess, Lex Mercatoria: A Reflexive Law Guide to an Autonomous Legal System, 2 GER. LJ.
17 (2001), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=l1&artID=109 (mentioning
that these are the standard positivist objections to the reflexive approach on a new Lex Mercatoria). For
research conducted by the Hague Institute for the Internationalization of Law on these issues, see Private
Transnational Regulatory Regimes, EUR. UNION INST., http://privateregulation.eu/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).
12. Gunther Teubner coined this term. See Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal
and Social Systems, 45 Am. J. COmP. L. 149, 157 (1997).
13. Transnational law, apart from been understood as a field of lawmaking, has lately been conceived as a
method that involves a mixed nature of regimes that is neither equal to public nor private international law.
See Peer Zumbansen, The Next 'Great Transformation'? The Double Movement in Transnational Corporate Gov-
ernance and Capital Markets Regulation, in KARL PoLANd, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAw IN
TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 181, 203-04 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011); see also Peer Zumban-
sen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 10 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 141 (2010); Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foun-
dations of Tranmational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. Soc'Y 20, 21 (2011).
14. Cafaggi, supra note 13, at 21.
15. See e.g., GRALF-PETER CALUESS & PEER ZuMBANSN, ROUGH CoNSENsuS AND RUNNING CODE: A
THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRuvATE LAW 248-77 (2010) (devoting an important chapter to transnational
corporate governance); Zumbansen, supra note 13, at 181; see also Eva Kocher, Codes of Conduct and Framework
Agreements on Social Minimum Standards - Private Regulation?, in RESPONSIBLE BuSINEss, supra note 9, at 67,
67-86 (referring mainly to transnational rules on corporate social responsibility).
16. For a long list of individual country's corporate governance codes, see Index of Codes, EUROPEAN CORP.
GOVERNANCE INST., http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all-codes.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
17. John W. Cioffi, Governing Globalization? The State, Law, and Structural Change in Corporate Governance,
27 J.L. Soc'Y 572, 587, 598-600 (2000); see also Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility:
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One aspect that points to the state's role is the enforceability of private regulation as a
means of guaranteeing that commitments made on private regulatory domains cannot be
disregarded without bearing the consequences. The recognition that obligations estab-
lished by self-regulatory measures are rarely enforced has led scholars to advocate for the
need to create binding international rules on certain aspects of corporate governance,
which should subsequently be internally adopted by nation states, and as a result, would
become enforceable.1s
But this is not the only aspect that suggests the state's importance when dealing with
private regulation. Both in transnational and in domestic environments, private norm-
making may involve questions of acute public interest, such as social, environmental, and
financial issues that call for state consideration. As highlighted by Saskia Sassen, there is
no need to overcome, or interest in overcoming, the nation state, especially in view of the
embedded nature of the global sphere in the national arena. 19 Subjects that embrace both
the national and the global arenas should be addressed through solutions that take into
consideration an allied composition of both spheres. Hence, even in cases where the state
no longer directly engages in economic regulation, it should be part of the process.20 This
means that, in many circumstances, there is a need to walk away from the dual distinction
between domains that are either fully private or fully public to reach one that is composed
of both parts.
To apply these observations to the multi-layered norm-setting processes of corporate
governance rules means the pursuit of corporate goals and the norms envisaged to regu-
late their achievement might not harm the public policy goals of the regulated area.
Therefore, although the existence of private authority must be recognized, and, in many
cases, praised, there is still a pressing need to guarantee that private regulation embraces a
high level of accountability with a wider range of values and interests.2'
Private regulation of corporate governance matters is commonly connected to a broad
array of standards, principles, and lists of best practices. Although most of the corporate
governance rules are designed to be used in the major epicenters of economic globaliza-
tion, they end up being adopted in less central areas, which account for completely differ-
Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 171, 172, 183 (2007) (arguing
the importance of the state especially as a driver of economic development and that voluntary self-regulation
"should supplement not supplant state regulation").
18. Engobo Emeseh, Rhuks Ako, Patrick Okonmah & Lawrence 0. Obokoh, Corporations, CSR and Self-
Regulation: What Lessonsfrom the Global Financial Crisis?, 11 GER. L.J. 230, 258 (2010) (advocating for a global
regulation on corporate social responsibility matters).
19. Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE Aumrorry iN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 91, 91-92 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
20. Id.
21. Edward J. Balleisen mentions the lack of "meaningful accountability to the values and concerns of a
larger democratic majority" as one of the most relevant critiques raised by the detractors of self-regulatory
measures. Edward J. Balleisen, The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United States: A Historian's View
from the Early Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGU-
LrnTON 443, 460 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010).
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ent economic and social settings. 22 In such cases, these regulatory regimes do not seem
sufficient, and, consequently, require a level of state participation.23
It is worth mentioning that this is not an attempt to affirm the sole importance of state
power or to deny legal pluralism, but to recognize the latter and to address the questions
raised in view of the lack of a state monopoly in lawmaking.24 Drawing on private regula-
tion as a feature of global legal pluralism, identifying the existence of normative authority
beyond the state, and the role played by corporations and other private actors in current
economic life, this article attempts to explore the necessary interaction between private
and state actors in order to assure that interests other than those of the private sphere are
being adequately handled. 25 In a way, this means assuring the social re-embedding 26 of
private regulatory measures.
Social scientists have been thinking of measures that foster confidence in private regula-
tion as a measure capable of promoting public goals. In such cases, private regulatory
instruments could be considered adequate policy tools. 27 The review of literature dealing
with the topic falls outside the purposes and limits of this study, but its claims support the
argument presented here. Representing a challenge to the conception that normative au-
thority must be centered exclusively in the state, the outsourcing of regulatory authority
to private actors should be aware of the mechanisms that assure a commitment from non-
governmental regulators to the public interest. The desired regulatory outcomes must be
kept in view. In other words, law beyond the state that is represented by the private
appropriation of norm-making authority must not be distant from the axiological perspec-
tive that involves norm-setting processes.
H. The Need for Alliance Between Corporate Governance Measures and
Ownership Structure: The Example of Regulation of Corporate
Control Negotiations
During the last few decades, corporate governance has become a topic of mainstream
concern among scholars, policy-makers, and executives. As a result, its content is defined
both by the aforementioned private regulation and by the various national regulatory
frameworks. In modern times, it is broadly recognized that corporate governance may
22. The North Atlantic systems are known as the center of gravity for the creation of such rules. See
Sassen, supra note 19, at 98-99.
23. This is exactly what is underneath the adoption by Brazilian companies of their own takeover rules, as
detailed infra in Section I1(C).
24. See Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT
A STATE 3, 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). As for the plurality of legal orders with a view on how legal
pluralism engages with legal globalization, see Railf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism 3 (Duke Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper, Paper No. 259, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1430395.
25. The importance of giving a voice to public concerns in the transnational law-making arena and the
difficulties involved have been already emphasized. See Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Transnational-
izing Private Law - The Public and the Private Dimensions of Transnational Commercial Law, 10 GER. L.J. 1341,
1343 (2009).
26. For comments on the social re-embeddness in view of the private international law field, see Horatia
Muir-Watt, Private International Law as Global Governance: Beyond Schize, from Closet to Planet (2011)
(unpublished paper), available at http://works.bepress.com/horatiamuir-watt/l.
27. Balleisen, supra note 21, at 463.
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affect the value and performance of firms and may also promote reliable capital markets
and economic development. 28
At the same time, the pervasiveness of a certain level of uniformity in topics of corpo-
rate governance around the world reminds us of the need to pay attention to the specifici-
ties of the actual place where the rules are applied. One needs to recognize that similar
norms might have strikingly dissimilar results depending on the characteristics of the mar-
ket in which the norms are put in place. 29
It has recently been argued that the efficiency and appropriateness of many governance
measures are intimately related to the ownership structure of the given market where they
are to be implemented. 30 This means that a company's ownership structure affects the
ways in which corporate governance arrangements are applied,31 and thus, governance
measures intended to guarantee good governance of widely held companies rarely suit
their controlled counterparts.
In fact, a public company with dispersed ownership, initially described by Berle and
Means, 32 may not be considered a worldwide pattern. 33 The causes of a specific design of
28. See, e.g., Alexander Schaub, Corporate Governance in Europe: An Address, 69 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABEL J. COMP. & IN'T'L PRIVATE L.] 619, 620
(2005) (Ger.).
29. The functionalist approach of some corporate scholars also led to the conclusion that what might look
like a harmonization in the adoption of some best practice rules is actually a "fausse convergence," if one
considers the way each rule works in jurisdictions where different ownership structures prevail. See Paul
Davies et al., Beyond the Anatomy, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW - A COMPARATIVE AND FUNc-
TIONAL APPROACH 305, 312-13 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
30. Lucian k Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1263, 1263-64 (2009); Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Taking U.K
Rules to Continental Europe, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 135, 139 (2008) (discussing specific considerations of takeover
regulation).
31. Eddy Wymeersch, Shareholder(s) Matter(s), in FESTSCHRIIT FOR KLAUS J. HolT ZUM 70. GEBURT-
STAG Am 24. AUGUST 2010: UNTERNEHMEN, MARKT UND VERANTWORTUNG [IN HONOR OF KLAUS J.
HOPT's 70TH BIRTHDAY ON AUG. 24, 2010: BUSINESS, MARKET, AND RESPONSIBiLITY] 1565, 1580 (Stefan
Grundmann et al. eds., 2010) (adopting such an approach in what concerns the use of the "one share one
vote" principle); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in Italy: A Comparative Perspective, in LA
SOCIETA PER AZIONI OGGI: TRADizIoNE, A-TUALITA E PROSPET1'IVE JOINT STOCK COMPANY TODAY:
TRADITION, NEWS & PERSPECTIVES] (Paola Balzarini, Giuseppe Carcano & Marco Ventoruzzo eds., 2007)
(sharing the same belief about the importance of ownership structure, especially in view of independent direc-
tors regulation).
32. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 2 (1933).
33. See, e.g., Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany, and
France, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 30 (1997) (indicating that there are two types of ownership and control
structures, the first being an outsider system that corresponds to dispersed ownership, such as what is found
in the United States and UK, while the second refers to a insider system characterized by a considerable level
of ownership concentration, even among listed companies. The latter would be the case of Continental
Europe and of Brazil). The same authors argue that the difference in ownership structures is due to the fact
that each structure is better suited to different types of corporate activity. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer,
Ownership and Control, in TRENDS IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION: Do PARTICIPATION AND COOPERATION
INCREASE COMPETITIVENESS? 171, 171-72 (Horst Siebert ed., 1995). For a critical review of the famous law
and finance scholarship aiming at explaining such differences that of John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed
Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE LJ. 1, 4-6
(2001); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of
Erternal Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); and Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1116 (1998).
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corporate ownership, either concentrated or dispersed, have been thoroughly investigated.
As for the reasons for certain ownership arrangements, an over-regulation thesis has ar-
gued that the rise of the separation of ownership and control in the United States was not
caused by economic-efficiency concerns, but instead, was the result of strict regulation
against concentration and bank participation in corporations. 34 Dissimilarly, Rafael La
Porta et al. claim that ownership concentration is the consequence of the absence of regu-
lation capable of conferring adequate investor protection, and they strongly associate dis-
persed ownership to common-law legal systems. 35 The Path Dependence Theory
presented some years later emphasized the importance of private benefits of control for
the maintenance of high levels of ownership concentration, 36 and also explained why the
consequences of inefficient regulation would be able to remain, thereby reinforcing the
role of history in the shape of law.37 Adopting a different approach, John C. Coffee, Jr.
believes that, although law matters, legal and political apparatuses do not precede, but,
instead, follow a change, and that the autonomy of the private sector and its private insti-
tutional structures were fundamental to the enlargement of dispersed ownership. 38
Although this is a subject of indisputable importance, it is not among the purposes of
this article to discuss the causes for the increase of dispersed or concentrated ownership
structures in a given market. But, it seems crucial to recognize the existence of different
patterns and to make sure that the specificities of each are taken into account when rules
of corporate governance are designed. In this sense, it is argued here that shareholder
structure patterns should never be overlooked by those creating corporate and capital
market laws and regulations, especially if one accepts the importance of a consistent regu-
latory structure for the development of a strong securities market.3 9
One of the governance areas that may prove this statement, and therefore deserves fur-
ther investigations, refers to the regulation of control acquisition transactions. The differ-
ences between friendly and hostile control transactions-frequent in companies with
concentrated and widely held control, respectively-are substantial, and the rules to be
applied in each case should reflect the dissimilarity.
On top of these concerns should be the fact that the basic agency conflict concerning
companies with dispersed and concentrated capital is strikingly different. While a key
feature of widely held corporations is the principal-agent problem between shareholders
and managers, controlled companies usually suffer from conflicts of interests and abusive
acts of controllers vis-i-vis the interests of the company and the minority shareholders. 4°
34. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERI-
CAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1996).
35. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 33, at 1131-32; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra
note 33, at 1116.
36. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control 26 (Harvard Law
and Econ. Discussion Paper, Paper No. 260, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract..id= 168990.
37. Lucian A. Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,
52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 139-54 (1999).
38. Coffee, supra note 33, at 5.
39. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L.
REv. 781 (2001).
40. This is widely known as the main governance problem of Brazilian public companies. See Alexandre Di
Miceli da Silveira & Armando L. Dias Jr., What is the Impact of Bad Governance Practices in a Concentrated
Ownership Environment?, 7 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 70, 71 (2010).
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In addition, during control transactions, some agency issues are intensified. On one hand,
in companies with a diffuse ownership structure, the parties involved in the shares transfer
(shareholders and acquirer) are not the same as those in the actual control transfer (board
and acquirer).41 This gives rise to distorted incentives for the management to use its
power to support or to obstruct the transactions according to its own interests, instead of
those of the shareholders. 42 On the other hand, in cases of concentrated ownership, the
transaction between the former and the new controller might happen in disregard of the
interests of other stakeholders. 43 When selling its shares, the former controller might
have no incentive to care about the company's destiny or the quality of its future govern-
ance, but only to consider its own profit-maximizing interest.44 By paying attention to the
dissimilarities of the main conflict in one case and the other,45 the importance of distin-
guishing between dispersed and controlled companies and the rules to be applied becomes
conspicuous.
In what specifically concerns the regulation of control negotiations, the study of the
takeover rules currently in force in a variety of legal systems shows that control transac-
tions of widely held companies may be approached in various ways and through diverse
legal measures. Some of the different approaches can be detected by looking at the strik-
ingly contrasting European and American experiences and regulations.
For example, one of the instruments found in both the U.K. City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers and the European Takeover Directive is to set a board neutrality rule, ac-
cording to which the target company's management may not take any action that could
possibly frustrate the success of the hostile takeover offer, unless the shareholders approve
the action during a shareholders' meeting.46 Another possible measure refers to the
mandatory bid.4 7 The mandatory bid requires the acquirer of corporate control to launch
a tender offer on all outstanding shares. A certain percentage of a public company's vot-
ing capital is legally established to constitute control and, once it is achieved, an offer on
the remaining shares must be announced for an equitable price and must correspond to
the highest amount paid for the controlling shares.48
41. Paul Davies & KlausJ. Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPAR-
ATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, supra note 29, at 225, 227-28.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Leo E. Strine Jr., Lecture & Commentary, The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stock-
holders in Charge of Control Transactions: Is There Any "There" There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (2002).
45. For an exploration of this difference in detail, see Davies & Hopt, supra note 41, at 227-29.
46. It is also known as the "no-frustration" rule (as set forth in Rule 21.1 of the City Code). See Joseph A.
McCahery, Luc Runneboog, Peer Ritter & Sascha Hailer, The Economics of the Proposed European Takeover
Directive, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 575 (Guido Ferrarini, Klaus J. Hopt,
Jaap Winter & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2004).
47. The use of a mandatory bid in the event that a specific threshold of stock ownership is acquired dates
back to 1972, when it was first introduced by the British City Code. Rolf Skog, Does Sweden Need a Mandatory
Bid Rule?: A Critical Analysis, in SEURF STUDIEs 2: THE EUROPEAN MONEY AND FINANCE FORUM 7
(Morten Balling ed., 1997). It is now set forth by Article 5 of the Takeover Directive as a rule of mandatory
transposition into national laws by the Member States. Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142/12) art. 5.
48. This reflects the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. See Jan Wouters, Paul van Hooghten &
Matias Bruyneel, The European Takeover Directive: A Commentary, in THE EUROPEAN TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 3, 14 (Paul van Hooghten ed., 2009); see also Klaus J. Hopt, European Takeover
Regulation: Barriers to and Problems of Harmonizing Takeover Law in The European Community, in EUROPEAN
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Yet another possibility, famous for being used in the United States, is to award the
management a high level of freedom to maneuver. 49 Directors are allowed an active role
and must stand up for the company's long-term interests when dealing with a takeover
attempt.5 0 There is no absolute prohibition to undertake defensive measures, and they are
not expected to accept an offer based solely for maximizing shareholder profits.SI The
freedom afforded to directors authorizes them to take defensive measures, provided they
are taken in observation of their fiduciary duties and are in the best interests of the com-
pany.52 The business judgment rule is applied with some adjustments, and managers are
to act on good faith and to guarantee that the measures undertaken are proportional to the
threat posed by the attempt to acquire the control.5 3
In general terms, these are some of the arrangements aimed at protecting investors
during a takeover attempt. The approaches adopted in Europe and the United States are
outstandingly different.54 In order to take such experiences into consideration and con-
sider takeover regulation in a country such as Brazil, which presents a singular legal, so-
cial, and economic framework, one needs to bear in mind that Brazil's corporate
ownership structure is mainly concentrated and was historically erected as such.55 As a
consequence, the legal measures envisaged to be applied to cases in which there is no
controlling shareholder should not be considered as a regulatory model for companies
whose control is exercised by a specific shareholder or group of shareholders.5 6
The aforementioned board neutrality rule provides a clear example of this. If, in widely
held companies, the mandatory shareholders' approval of any defensive measure to be
taken by the management aims at attacking the agency problem between directors and
investors, the same rationality does not apply to control transactions of controlled firms
where the agency problem, as mentioned earlier, is between the controller and the minor-
TAKEOVERS - LAW AND PRACTICF 165, 179 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1992) (critically ana-
lyzing the use of the principle as the basis for the mandatory offer).
49. See John Armour & David Skeel Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? - The Peculiar
Divergence of U.S. and U.K Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1727 (2007).
50. Id. at 1734.
51. Id. at 1735.
52. See Armour & Skeel, Jr., supra note 49, at 1729; Nikolaos Andronikos, A US lawyer's perspective on the
EU Takeover Directive, in COMMON LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE 42,45 (Dirk Van
Gerven ed., 2008).
53. For a critical comment on this topic, see Paul L. Davies, The Regulation of Defensive Tactics in the United
Kingdom and the United States, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS, supra note 48, at 195, 204.
54. Regarding the origin of the differences in takeover regulations in the United States and the United
Kingdom, with the United Kingdom influencing European rules, see Armour & Skeel, Jr., supra note 49
(addressing the differences as a matter of public choice and arguing that self-regulatory and shareholder
protective rules were adopted by the United Kingdom as a result of the influence of institutional investors,
while the managers were benefited by the American judicial lawmaking system that makes it difficult for
shareholders to influence the rules). For comparison, see William Magnuson, Takeover Regulation in the
United States and Europe: An Institutional Approach, 21 PACE INT'L L. REv. 205 (2009). See also Marco
Ventoruzzo, Europe's Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means and Political and Eco-
nomic Ends, 41 TEx. INT'L L.J. 171 (2006); Stefanie Denzel, DIE NEUTRALITATSPFLICHT IMd EUROPATSGHEN
UBERNAHMERECHT - EIN VERGLEICH MIT DEM US-AMERIKANISCHEN SYSTEM DER MODIFIED BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE [THE OBLIGATION OF NEUTRALITY IN THE EUROPEAN TAKEOVER LAW - A COMPARI-
SON WITH THE U.S. SYSTEM, THE MODIFIED BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE] (2005).
55. For details, see infra Section mH.
56. As detailed in Section flI(C), this is the main problem when Brazilian public companies adopt private
regulations.
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ity shareholders. In companies that have concentrated control, the controller owns a suf-
ficient percentage of voting rights, which guarantees power over the company's activities,
even if the controller does not own the majority of the shares. Thus, a shareholders'
meeting decision on possible defensive measures does not serve the purpose of protecting
investors because, in practice, the decision belongs to the controller. In fact, granting the
shareholders (meaning, at the end of the day, the controller) this decisional power may
cause even more damage to minority investors. But this will not occur in situations where
minority shareholders hold a considerable percentage of voting shares, make actual use of
their voting rights, and certain defensive measures requiring a supermajority are adopted.
But at the same time that a neutrality rule is not compatible with a concentrated envi-
ronment, leaving managers to decide possible defensive measures might also not provide
an adequate regulatory solution. In many companies with a concentrated ownership
structure, the board often acts under direct orders and without questioning the decisions
taken by the controlling shareholder.57 In such circumstances, granting authority to the
managers and letting them decide the appropriateness of the takeover attempt will not
solve the conflict unless an accurate independence rule is in place and duly enforced over
the managers.58
This is only a brief illustration of what is implied here: takeover regulation, as a corpo-
rate-governance measure, must always consider the ownership structure of the public
company. In the case of Brazilian capital markets, whose details will be presented next,
there is a clear need for rules that are attentive to a very heterogeneous scenario that is
characterized by a majority of controlled companies, and a possible growing number of
widely held corporations, most of which still have a shareholder owning a large percentage
of the voting capital.
M. A Case Study: The Brazilian Takeover Regulation
Before going through the regulation of control transactions in Brazil, it is important to
say a few words about the ownership structure of public companies listed in the Brazilian
capital market. Controlled companies have historically dominated this market. In con-
trast to what might be found in foreign public policies concerning the organization of
large firms, 59 to a great extent, Brazilian law stimulated the concentration of private eco-
nomic power. During the twentieth century and especially during the military dictator-
ship, the incorporation of large publicly traded companies was strongly encouraged by a
public policy aimed at strengthening the national market. One of the declared purposes of
57. KlausJ. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1161,
1166 (Mathias Reimarm & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
58. The importance of corporate governance rules that guarantee board independence has already been
highlighted elsewhere. See Sheila C. Neder Cerezetti, Administradores independentes e independincia dos ad-
ministradores: regras societdriasfundamentais ao estmulo do mercado de capitais brasileiro [Independent Directors and
the Independence of Directors: Fundamental Corporate Rules for Stimulating the Brazilian Capital Market], in
TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETARIO E EMPRESARIAL CONTEmPORANEOs [THEMES OF CONTEMPORARY COR-
PORATE AND BustNEss LAw] 571 (Marcelo V. von Adamek ed., 2010).
59. For an explanation on the American structure of large public firms, which is mainly based upon share-
holders' dissociation from managers and control, see Roe, supra note 34.
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the Corporate Law of 1976 (Law n. 6,404) was to fortify national conglomerates, 60
thereby favoring the enhancement of concentrated ownership patterns.
As a result, the governance structure of Brazilian public corporations is characterized by
the presence of strong controlling shareholders, managers who are usually subservient to
the controller's interests, and almost no participation of other stakeholders in business
decisions.61 Here, the historical roots and political decisions largely explain the reasons
why concentrated ownership is not an exception, but the rule.
The ownership design in such terms led to a regulation of control transactions focused
mainly, if not solely, on the control negotiations of controlled companies, as detailed be-
low.62 But the recent emergence of companies with less concentrated corporate capital
has brought about the need for regulation capable of dealing with a new and quite differ-
ent reality-a regulation of corporate control that is attentive to a new form of corporate
ownership structure.
The response to such need, if aimed at improving the mechanisms for investor protec-
tion during control transactions, should be aware of what has already been argued here,
i.e. measures that enhance investor protection in companies with a controlling share-
holder, which constitute the majority in Brazil, frequently present a different level of im-
portance than in widely held firms. At the same time, any sort of rule addressing the issue
needs to consider the experience observed up to now in a system that holds a distinctive
trait of private regulation, as described below. 63
A. A STATE REGULATION FOCUSED ON PrVATE NEGOTIATIONS OF CORPORATE
CONTROL
The predominance of highly concentrated companies in Brazil is reflected in the ab-
sence of rules regarding hostile takeovers. In fact, the Brazilian legal framework on con-
trol transactions is specifically designed to deal with private negotiations of previously
existing corporate control.
Due to the prevalent concentrated ownership structure, in contrast to what is found in
the United States or in the United Kingdom, bids do not take place before the control
acquisition or as a means to it; instead, they occur as a consequence of control-transfer
private deals. 64 Indeed, pursuant to Article 254-A of the Brazilian Corporate Law,65 the
transmission of shares representing the control of a public company triggers the duty to
60. The jurists responsible for writing the project of the Corporations Law, Jos6 Luiz Bulh6es Pedreira and
Alfredo Lamy Filho, call attention to such purpose, explaining that the law was approved under the belief that
the institutionalized macro-enterprise should be officially stimulated. ALFREDO LAMy FILHO & JosEt Lusz
BULHOES PEDREIRA, DIREITO DAS COMPANHIAS [CoMPANY LAW] 775, 796-97 (2009).
61. According to Calixto Salomao Filho, the main problem is not so much the highly concentrated owner-
ship of Brazilian companies, but the fact that the controller is legally erected as a legitimated center of power.
Calixto Salomdo Filho, Organizafdo lnterna: Estrutura Orgdnica Trplice [Internal Organization: Triple Organiza-
tional Structure], in 0 Novo DiRErro SocIETARIO [THE NEW CORPORATE LAw] 89, 98 (4th ed. 2011).
62. See infra Section I1(A).
63. See infra Section I1(C).
64. To a certain extent, this is or used to be the case in some countries of Continental Europe as well. Eddy
Wymeersch, Problems of the Regulation of Takeover Bids in Western Europe, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS, Supra
note 48, at 95, 101-103.
65. In a free translation, the article reads as follows:
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launch a bid on the remaining voting shares for at least 80 percent of the price paid for the
control shares. 66 The acquirer of the control of a publicly traded company must launch a
public tender offer, known as an OPA (oferta pziblica de affes), which constitutes either a
condition precedent or subsequent to the transfer of control and must cover all shares
with permanent voting rights that are issued by the company.
The requirement of compulsory tender offers satisfies two goals. The first is the distri-
bution of part of the controlling premium to the minority shareholders, and the second is
to provide an opportunity for investors to exit in the event that the control shift is not
desirable to them.
It is worth mentioning that the mandatory bid is, in many respects, different from the
one provided in the above-mentioned European Directive. The duty to launch the offer is
not related to the direct or indirect acquisition of a specific percentage of voting shares but
to the transmission of corporate control.67 There is, therefore, a need for a change in the
holder of the control power for the tender offer to occur. The holder of the control
power is understood as a shareholder who: (i) holds the ownership of shares that perma-
nently assure the holder of the majority of votes in shareholders' meetings and the power
to elect the majority of management; and (ii) actually uses such power to direct corporate
activities and to guide the operations of the company.68 The absence of a threshold indi-
cating the clear meaning of control power has, on one hand, the disadvantage of making
the mandatory bid less predictable and of raising exalted discussions about the application
of the rule.69 On the other hand, not having a rigid standard makes it possible to embrace
de facto transfers and to avoid abuses.
"Article 254-A. The direct or indirect transfer of control of a publicly traded corporation can
only be effected under the condition that the purchaser agrees to conduct a tender offer to ac-
quire the voting shares owned by the remaining shareholders. The offer price for such shares
shall be at least eighty per cent (80%) of the amount paid for the voting shares comprising the
controlling block. First Paragraph. Transfer of control shall be understood as the transfer,
whether direct or indirect, of shares comprising the controlling block, of shares subject to share-
holders' agreements and of securities convertible into voting shares, assignment of share subscrip-
tion rights and other rights related to securities convertible into shares which result in the transfer
of corporate control."
For a full translation of Brazil's Corporate Law, see The Commission, Comissio de Valores Mobilirios [Sec. &
Exchange Comm'n Brazil], www.cvm.gov.br (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
66. In its original text, Article 254 of the Corporate Law required all minority shareholders to receive equal
treatment in case of acquisition of a company's control, which means that they should be offered the same
price paid for the shares representing the control. See Viviane Muller Prado & Bruno M. Salama, How Are
Shareholders of Listed Companies Protected in Brazil? 7 (2008), available at http://www.ppge.ufrgs.br/giacomo/
arquivos/gov-corp/prado-salama-2008.pdf. This rule was erased in 1997, as the government intended to fa-
cilitate control transactions of state-owned companies. Id. The reform of 2001 brought back the so-called
tag-along rights, but restricted it to common shares and to the minimum price of 80 percent of the price paid
for controlling shares. Id.
67. See Lei No. 6,404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, DiAuo OiCIAL DA UNMtO [D.O.U.] de 17.12.1976
(Braz.).
68. Id. art. 116.
69. Such discussions are very usual in cases involving sales of control and the mandatory OPA in Brazil.
The recurrent legal debates about the applicability of the rule to a variety of cases points to the lasting
uncertainty involving the subject. The uncertainty is especially common in cases where corporate control is
shared among various shareholders and one or more shareholders sell their stake. See, e.g., CVM, RJ2005/
4069, Diretor-Relator: Pedro Olivia Marcillo de Sousa, 11.4.2006, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/
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The broad idea of a mandatory bid rule relates to the intention of protecting non-
controlling shareholders7 0 by giving them the opportunity to sell their shares at the same
or similar price to that paid for the controlling shares. As a consequence, the control
premium is shared with the minority shareholders, who also have an opportunity to leave
the company if the former presumed trustworthy controller decided to sell or transfer his
power over the corporation. Therefore, the introduction of a compulsory tender offer in
Brazilian law reflects a political choice that considers non-controlling shareholders as co-
owners of at least a part of the premium for corporate control. It also suggests that effi-
ciency arguments, such as the indication that mandatory offers may discourage the devel-
opment of a market for corporate control, are neither the only, nor the most important
concern.
But in Brazil, the mandatory bid rule refers only to the transfer of control and not its
acquisition. The acquirer is not required to launch a public offer unless the control is
purchased from a pre-existing controlling shareholder. Thus, investors are only protected
in situations of concentrated ownership structures.
In a concentrated environment, one may understand the reasons why only a friendly
sale of pre-existing control triggers a compulsory tender offer. In fact, a hostile takeover
is only possible if the company does not have a stable controlling majority shareholder.
Nevertheless, once the benefits of widespread ownership have been recognized, and given
the existence of a movement towards dispersion, the Brazilian capital market would only
benefit from a comprehensive discipline of takeovers that embraces not only transfers, but
also simple acquisitions of control.
There is yet another problem in requiring the compulsory tender offer only in cases
where control is acquired from a former controlling shareholder. This approach, in con-
trast to what may be found in Europe, does not discourage the creation or the strengthen-
ing of concentrated-ownership structures because it does not require a compulsory-tender
offer when a certain significant percentage of the voting capital is acquired by a person or
a group acting together. At the same time, conversely, providing for mandatory offers in
terms of private regulation as described below might also contribute both to the creation
of inequalities and entrenchment of controlling shareholders. 71
In addition to the above-described regulation of friendly control acquisition transac-
tions, Brazil's Corporate Law also provides for voluntary bids devised to obtain control of
a public company.72 The acquisition of controlling shares by voluntary public offers is not
widely used, precisely because of the highly concentrated ownership structures of most of
the publicly traded companies.
descol/respdecis.asp?File=4788-0.HTM; CVM, RJ 2007/7230, Director-Relator: Eli Loria, 11.7.2007, availa-
ble at http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/infos/CopesulEli.pdf.
70. As to whether investors need to be protected, see Wymeersch, supra note 64, at 351, 356-57. See also
Klaus J. Hopt, American Corporate Governance Indices As Seen From a European Perspective, 158 U. PA. L. REv.
PENNUMBRA 27, 30 (2009) (commenting, from the European perspective, that European corporate law has
always reflected that it is necessary to protect minority shareholders because the majority of companies have a
controlling shareholder).
71. See infra Section Im(C).
72. See Lei No. 6,404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, DLARiO OnCIL DA UNiAo [D.O.U.] de 17.12.1976,
art. 257 (Braz.).
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Regulation on this topic has also been put forward by the Brazilian Securities Commis-
sion (Comissdo de Valores Mobilidrios - CVM). The CVM Instru~io (Instruction) n. 361
dealing with control transactions was recently amended. One of the most important
changes refers precisely to voluntary public offers that may be launched in an attempt to
acquire control of a company. More protective rules have been approved for partial of-
fers, which certainly represent a regulatory advancement, especially with regard to the
rights of shareholders in widely held corporations.
In spite of such improvements, to date, the Brazilian legal framework is not in a position
to deal with transactions over non-stable control of public companies. In fact, neither of
the two most common legal techniques provided for by takeover regulations, namely, the
compulsory tender offer in the event of mere acquisition (and not transfer) of the corpo-
rate control and the defensive measures, is mentioned either by Brazilian corporate law or
by other public regulations.
In fact, the Brazilian system does not impose limits on the adoption of defensive mea-
sures by a target company wishing to resist a hostile takeover. Although some transactions
are forbidden, such as the one that prevents the company from acquiring its own shares,
their application is not restricted to cases of takeover attempts, and they are not aimed at
avoiding a protective tactic by the target company. This does not mean, however, that
directors are considered free to take any actions to frustrate the control shift. In Brazil,
the powers granted to directors are usually not as extensive as they may be in other coun-
tries. Many measures may only be adopted through a decision taken by the shareholders,
and, in any case, managers are required to act under fiduciary duties and in the strict
interest of the company, although the fiduciary duties are not as strongly enforced as one
might expect. 73 Similarly, Brazilian corporations do not face limitations, such as those of
the so-called breakthrough rule, which neutralizes some defensive devices (restrictions on
the transfers of shares and voting rights) provided in the bylaws of a target company or in
shareholders' agreements. 74
B. THE SHY MovEMENT TOwARDs DISPERSED OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND THE
PROSPECT OF UNREGULATED HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
The existence of widely held companies in a given market opens room for hostile take-
overs and asks for a normative response. Conceiving of adequate regulation involves de-
73. Modesto Carvalhosa, The Brazilian Experience With Respect to Tender Offers, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC.
REG. 103, 109 (1981).
74. The breakthrough rule is a measure provided by the European Directive. Commission Staff Working
Document: Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, at 7, SEC (2007) 268 (Feb. 21, 2007),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemaLmarket/company/docs/takeoverbids/2007-02-report-en.pdf. It is an
optional rule, which means that the Member States may decide if they want to adopt it. Id. As indicated in
the Report,
the vast majority of Member States have not imposed (or are unlikely to impose) the break-
through rule, but have made it optional for companies. Breakthrough is expected to be imposed
only by the Baltic States. None of the other countries will oblige their companies to apply this
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ciding whether takeovers are to be incentivized, 75 hindered, or treated neutrally, while still
granting adequate protection to the shareholders.76
Regulators in jurisdictions that are dominated by concentrated ownership structures
may not disregard the arguments for and against the introduction of takeover-friendly
rules when they regulate the control of a public corporation. Such takeover-friendly rules,
which are aimed at promoting an active market for corporate control in a country charac-
terized by concentrated ownership and private benefits of control, may either: (i) cause
companies with a concentrated ownership to become less likely to shift to a widespread
structure because the controller will not be willing to lose its benefits and leave the availa-
ble control of the company in an active market for a third party to acquire it and enjoy
such private benefits of control; or (ii) make concentrated ownership less attractive when a
market for corporate control is in place and could help to reduce the high managerial costs
of dispersed structures. 77
Given the historical origins of Brazilian corporate law and the protection and even en-
couragement of concentrated ownership structures, the choice to make concentrated own-
ership less attractive does not seem to give hope for the future adoption of diffuse
ownership. Indeed, the almost complete absence of diffusely owned public firms is not
duly explained by the threat posed by the high agency costs, which are not even an object
of concern given the unquestionable power exercised by controlling shareholders over the
directors and officers.78
Due to structural features-i.e., the highly concentrated ownership structure of publicly
traded companies-the simple idea of a market for corporate control could not be advo-
cated in Brazil until recently. The threat of a hostile takeover and the mechanisms availa-
ble to face it were not a matter of concern for either managers or corporate law specialists.
The presence of concentrated stockholders worked as an obstruction to the occurrence of
such movements. This means that, by being highly concentrated, control becomes
incontestable.
75. Stimulating the market for corporate control by providing takeover instruments is one of the possible
regulatory approaches. The availability of regulatory mechanisms to facilitate takeover bids is deemed benefi-
cial by some authors. See, e.g., Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids, at 19, (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/docs/take-
overbids/2002-01-hlg-report.en.pdf. The alleged benefits of such an approach include the exploitation of
synergies by the enterprises involved, the advantages of selling the shares for more than the market price, and
the removal of managers who are unable to efficiently conduct the company. See id.; see also Henry G. Marine,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110 (1965) (famously praising the benefits of a
market for corporate control, especially against managerial inefficiency).
76. There are many theories that argue for the benefits of the existence of a market for corporate control
and the efficiencies of takeovers. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regula-
tion, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS, supra note 48, at 3 (presenting explanations for takeovers and regulatory
implications). For a critical approach of policies directed at maximizing the frequency of takeovers, see John
C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control. A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984).
77. See Allen Ferrell, Why Continental European Takeover Law Matters, in REFORMING COMPANY AND
TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 46, at 561, 564-65; see alsoJos6 M. Garrido Garcia, Company Law and
Capital Markets Law, 69 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNAIIONALES PRIVATRECHT
[RABEL J. COMP. & INT'L PRIVATE L.] 761, 774 (2005).
78. An empirical research study showed that the election of independent directors among Brazilian public
companies is inversely proportional to the concentration of control. See Schiell & Santos, supra note 3, at
378.
VOL. 46, NO. 4
THE PUBLIC I4TEREST 975
Thus, the corporate governance system in Brazil distinctly differs from its American or
British counterparts. 79 Even when compared with systems characterized by control con-
centration, such as many continental European countries, the dissimilarities persist. Dis-
similarities exist not only because minority stockholders are still granted good protection
in such countries, in spite of the typical concentrated ownership structure,80 but also be-
cause it is possible to identify a considerable amount of widely held companies. 8' Until
2005, there were no widely held public corporations in Brazil, and only 1 percent of pub-
licly traded companies may be considered as widely held.8 2 Given this scenario, Brazil
faces very singular problems, and, instead of dealing with agency issues between managers
and shareholders, Brazil's corporate law struggles against conflicts of interests and abuses
involving the controller.
Considering the specifics of the Brazilian market and the extremely small number of
potential targets, no public hostile offer has succeeded to date. Although there are a con-
siderable number of listed companies and negotiations taking place on the Brazilian stock
market, only a very small number of corporations may be considered an actual target of a
hostile takeover.
Even though the data explains why, up to now, hostile takeover regulation has not been
among the topics regulators have considered, it should not represent a barrier to further
evolution of law on this matter. Given the emergence of some listed companies with
widespread capital on the Brazilian market, especially in the listing segment called Novo
Mercado,83 there is an urgent call for discussions and regulation on this subject.
The recent market developments call for fast but well thought out responses, which can
both keep up with the new reality and protect the interests of stakeholders deemed impor-
tant by the Brazilian corporate governance system.
To sum up, given the near inexistence of hostile takeovers, the legal framework cur-
rently in force does not include rules related to hostile takeovers. For example, there are
no rules related to the use of anti-takeover measures by the target company's board of
directors or the consequences of the acquisition of a relevant amount of voting shares.
This lack of regulation may have been considered reasonable until now because the mar-
79. See generally John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs & Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Comparative Analysis of Hostile
Takeover Regimes in the US, UK and Japan (with implications for Emerging Markets) 2, 87 (Colum. L. &
Econ. Working Paper No. 377, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1657953.
80. See MarkJ. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 257 (2002) (showing that concentrated
ownership is not always a clear and sole sign of poor corporate law and bad protection of minority sharehold-
ers). See also Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, Innovation in Corporate
Law, 31 J. COMp. ECON. 676 (2003) (arguing convincingly against the theory that better corporate law and
minority shareholder protection is necessarily related to common law systems and presenting an analysis
based on the capacity of legal systems to innovate).
81. The presence of some widely held companies led most of the Continental European countries to regu-
late (sometimes by self-regulation) hostile takeover attempts during the twentieth century. See Wymeersch,
supra note 64. In the beginning of the 1990s, Theodor Baums reported a total of eighty widely held and
traded companies in Germany. THEODOR BAUMS, TAKEOVERS VS. INSTITUTIONS IN CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE IN GERMANY 2 (1992).
82. ALEXANDRE DI MICELI DA SILvEIRA, GovERNANCA CORPORATIVA NO BRASIL E NO MUNDO - TE-
ORIA E PRATICA (CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL AND THE WORLD - THEORY AND PRACTICE]
179,183 (2010) (referring to data collected in 2009).
83. See Gorga, supra note 4, at 447.
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ket historically has been composed of companies with highly concentrated ownership
structures, and, as such, there was no space for a market for corporate control. But con-
sidering the recent suggestions that this scenario may be changing, in addition to actual
attempts of hostile takeovers,S4 an overall concept for regulating the market for corporate
control becomes of crucial importance.
The functional development of Brazilian capital markets depends on a framework capa-
ble of disciplining the change of control and of ensuring investor protection in both situa-
tions. On one hand, the current alleged movement towards dispersed ownership among
publicly traded companies in Brazil demands a detailed takeover regulation; on the other
hand, the indisputable great majority of public companies have a controlling shareholder
and should be sustained by clear rules regarding the stakeholders' rights in the event that
the controller decides to sell his or her shares.
Such regulation gains even more importance if one considers the content of some pro-
visions on anti-takeover measures recently included in the bylaws of some publicly traded
Brazilian companies. The movement towards private regulation is addressed in the next
section.
C. THE PRIVATE REGULATION OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND ITS INCONSISTENCIES
As mentioned above, private regulation has become a recurrent way of dealing with the
lack of, or the limitations of, public regulation. In both transnational and domestic envi-
ronments, the norm-production by private actors has both gained importance and, at the
same time, raised concerns. Private regulation occurs in a variety of forms, including
guidelines, codes of conduct, standardization through contracts, and organizational rules,
such as corporate bylaws.
The absence of both satisfactory and timely regulation regarding takeover attempts fos-
tered the emergence of private rules. Some companies listed on the Novo Mercado seg-
ment of BM&FBovespa8s amended their bylaws to include anti-takeover measures
currently known as "Brazilian poison-pills."8 6 "Brazilian poison pills" require a tender
offer to be launched for all outstanding shares whenever a certain percentage of the com-
pany's voting capital is obtained. The threshold is often set at 20 percent of the voting
shares,87 and the remaining shareholders must be offered a significant premium.88 The
obligatory payment of usually much more than the trading price of the stocks works as a
84. The famous and first case of a hostile takeover attempt in Brazil was over the control of Perdigao S.A.
by its biggest competitor, Sadia S.A., in 2006. The takeover was not successful because holders of a large
amount of shares did not agree with the price offered. After three years, the two companies ended up inte-
grating their activities, but this was not due to a takeover, but an Association Agreement signed by both
parties. See CVM, RJ2009/4691, Incorporaqao de aq6es envolvendo Companhia Aberta [Merger of Shares
Involving a Listed Company], 8.6.2009, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/respdecis.asp?File=
6584-1.HTM. Another well-known case refers to the acquisition of control of GVT (Holding) S.A. by
Vivendi S.A. in 2009. But although there was a battle for the control, this may not be deemed a classic hostile
acquisition. Actually, the former controllers of GVT agreed to sell their shares to Vivendi, which represented
almost 30 percent of GVT's voting capital, and other shares were also acquired through private agreements
with other groups of important investors. The Spanish group Telefonica tried to acquire the control through a
hostile takeover attempt but failed in the face of private negotiations conducted by Vivendi.
85. For further details, see infra Section IV(A).
86. See Gorga, supra note 4, at 480.
87. This is the case of more than half of the companies that adopted a poison pill provision. Id. at 481.
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relevant disincentive not only against attempts to gain control, but also against obtaining a
certain level of concentration.
It is worth mentioning that such bylaw provisions were clearly influenced by the Euro-
pean takeover rules, which, as mentioned above, also contemplate a mandatory tender
offer in the event of control attainment. This shows yet another complicated feature of
some private regulatory regimes, namely, the transplantation of rules with no concern
regarding their adequacy to the reality and needs of the importer country's system.
In a jurisdiction dominated by companies that are not truly widely held but have a main
shareholder or group of controllers that might be easily identified, the bylaw provisions
setting forth "poison pills," under the laudable argument of allegedly offering protection
to ownership dispersion, are paradoxically a means to help the controllers maintain their
stock positions by making any threat to their positions unreasonably expensive. In cases
where the acquisition of a certain percentage does not actually mean the acquisition of
corporate control-because this is detained by one or more shareholders bound through a
shareholders' agreement-the mandatory bid rules serve the purpose of protecting con-
trollers at the cost of posing disincentives to transactions that could otherwise be benefi-
cial to both the company and its stakeholders.
This means that by privately adopting a mandatory bid rule, companies with a distinct
controlling shareholder can make use of a legal device created for widely held corpora-
tions. As a consequence, instead of improving investor protection, the rule safeguards the
controllers who are then shielded from the risk of losing their power over the corporation.
The scenario becomes even more disturbing if one considers that private regulation is
meant to be self-preserving, in the sense that the mandatory bid provisions are accompa-
nied by bylaws that obligate the shareholders who vote in favor of removing the
mandatory bid provisions from the bylaws to launch a mandatory offer to acquire all
shares issued by the company. Some investors have questioned the validity of such provi-
sions, and, as a result, the CVM has declared that they are not aligned with the corporate
law and decided that no sanctions would be applied to shareholders that fail to launch an
offer after having voted to abolish the "poison pills."89 Interestingly, since 2011, compa-
nies listed on the Novo Mercado have been prohibited from including in their bylaws any
sort of burden on shareholders who vote in favor of eliminating the "poison pills."90
In light of the fact that private stipulation of "poison pills" became a relatively common
practice, an attempt was made to regulate the subject under the self-regulatory means of
88. The price paid by the acquirer in such mandatory offers varies from company to company. In some of
them, it might refer to a percentage of the share issuance price or of the stock market price. See, e.g., Bylaws
of Lojas Renner SA., art. 43, 2 (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.mzweb.com.br/renner/web/ar-
quivos/EstatutoSocial_30032009_ing.pdf. In others, it might be equal to the highest stock market price dur-
ing a certain period of time, the highest price paid by the acquirer at any time, or be dependent on the
company's EBITDA. See, e.g., By-Laws of Natura Cosmdticos S.A., art. 2, $ 2 (Aug. 5, 2009), available at
http://natura.infoinvest.com.br/enu/2259/EstatutoSocialConsolidado.2009.08.05.eng.pdf.
89. See CVM Parecer de Orientaggo [Legal Opinion] n. 36/2009 (Comissao de Valores Mobilirios, 29 de
Junho de 2009) [Securities and Exchange Commission], June 29, 2009), available at www.cvm.org.br.
90. This reflects an amendment to the Novo Mercado Listing Rules, to which a majority of the listed
companies agreed. See Confira o Resultado da Proposta de Alterafdo Dos Regulamentos do Novo Mercado, Niveis I e
2 [Cbeck the Result of the Proposed Amendment of the Listing Rules of the Novo Mercado, Level 1 and 2],
BM&FBovEsPA, http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/empresas/pages/100909NotA.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
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the Novo Mercado Listing Rules. 9 1 But most of the companies listed on the Novo Mercado
did not agree to amend such rules to set forth a mandatory bid in the event that a certain
percentage of the voting capital was achieved. 92
Strikingly, and a strong indication of the misuse of the mandatory bid rule by Brazilian
companies with concentrated ownership structure, one case of dispute over the matter
became famous when a new controlling shareholder questioned the application of the
"poison pill" provision, alleging that in cases of control acquisition from a former control-
ler, the legal mandatory bid rule, and not the one provided by the bylaws, should be
respected. After having acquired the control power from a former controller, which
meant the achievement of the threshold of voting shares set forth in the bylaws as trigger-
ing the mandatory bid, the new controller wanted to respect only the less burdensome
rule contained in Article 254-A of the Corporate Law. 93 According to such a biased inter-
pretation, the bylaws are not applied to cases of direct control acquisition from a former
controller, but only to situations of acquisitions from multiple shareholders.94
The private regulation described here could be seen as an effort to adopt clear rules and
to fill a lacuna caused by the lack of public ruling after an important change in the owner-
ship structure of some Brazilian publicly traded companies. But in this case, private gov-
ernance benefits a small group of shareholders involved in the delicate situation of a
hostile takeover and overlooks the interests of other constituencies. The consequences of
the adoption of the "poison pill" provisions show the urgency of approving a detailed
takeover regulation, equally capable of dealing with both hostile and friendly acquisitions,
and the need to consider all the stakeholders' interests.
When conceiving this indispensable regulation, regulators should bear in mind that the
mandatory bid rule is a reasonable measure in cases of genuine ownership dispersion.
When a controlling shareholder is in place, this mechanism might not always satisfactorily
benefit all the company's constituencies. 95
91. See id.
92. Sixty out of ninety-three companies who voted on the subject did not agree with the inclusion of such
mandatory bid rule in the Novo Mercado Listing Rules. Id. On the other hand, sixty-eight companies agreed
that the Listing Rules should forbid bylaw rules setting forth the mandatory bid. Id. Given such contradic-
tory results on the adoption of a mandatory bid rule, BM&FBovespa consulted once again the companies
listed in Novo Mercado on the subject. After the new polling, the prohibition of adoption of a mandatory bid
rule was not adopted in the new version of the Listing Rules. See BM&FBovespa anuncia resultado da
retomada da audi~ncia restrita do processo de revisgo do regulamento do Novo Mercado [BM&FBovespa
Announces the Results of the Resumed Hearing on the Amendment of the Listing Rules of the Novo Mer-
cado], BM&FBovEsPA, http://www.brnfbovespa.com.br/empresas/pages/BMFBOVESPA-anuncia-resultado-
da-audiencia-restrita-10-11-03.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
93. The case was brought before the Market Arbitration Panel (CAM - Cimara de Arbitragem do Mer-
cado). See Yuki Yokoi, Droga de Ptlula,76 REViSTA CAPITAL ABERTO 22, 26 (2009).
94. This is different from what derives from the Takeover Directive, which allegedly inspired the poison
pill rules and whose mandatory bid rule applies in cases of hostile takeover as well as in sales of controlling
blocks. Under the European rule, all sorts of acquisitions trigger the duty to launch a mandatory bid. Cf
Davies & Hopt, supra note 41, at 260.
95. For previous comments on what regulatory response could better meet Brazil's market needs and char-
acteristics, see Sheila C. Neder Cerezetti, A Aquisifdo de Controle de Companhias Aberas no Brasil: Por uma
Disciplina Atenta its Diferentes Estruturas Aciondrias [The Acquisition of Control of Public Companies in Brazil:
Towards a Discipline Aware ofDifferent Stockbolding Structures], 1 MrITEILUNGEN DER DEJTSCH-BRASILINIS-
CHEN JURiSTENVEREINIGUNG [GERMAN-BRAZILiAN LAWYERS ASSOcuTION] 15, 2 7-28 (2011).
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IV. Aligning Private Regulation with the Public Interest: The
Reinforcement of Best Practices of Corporate Governance by Taking
the Patterns of Ownership Structure into Account
As mentioned above, private regulation plays an important role when it comes to corpo-
rate governance. 96 Some factors are believed to be important for the success of private
mechanisms of regulatory governance.97 First of all, private actors must be committed to
the regulatory purposes, receive sufficient resources, enjoy institutional autonomy, and be
given clear regulatory missions. Apart from these needs, public authorities must effi-
ciently oversee the activities of the private actor and receive adequate information about
them.98 To do so, the state must have a qualified staff able to appraise the performance of
private actors. It is also important that non-governmental regulators face the threat of
losing their powers to the public authorities in the event of misconduct and that a degree
of transparency is guaranteed, so third parties can also assess the regulatory activity. 99
Some sort of public interaction seems, therefore, to be advantageous. Dealing with the
limits of private regulation allows public regulation to convey its recognized benefits,
while still keeping its shortcomings in mind. 100
An example of a private self-regulatory measure in the Brazilian capital market serves as
evidence of the importance of the above-mentioned private commitment to public regula-
tory goals. As detailed in the next section, the creation of a special listing segment in the
BM&FBovespa stock exchange, the Novo Mercado, effectively promoted the consolidation
of best practices of corporate governance and fostered investor protection. In contrast to
what occurred in the case of the aforementioned takeover private regulation, the creation
of the Novo Mercado through self-regulatory measures represents a laudable case of align-
ment between private regulation and the public good.
A. Novo MERCADO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SELF-REGULATION
The self-regulatory experience of the Brazilian capital markets is a successful example of
the alignment of self-regulation with public concerns. Brazilian stock exchanges, private
entities that might be incorporated as associations or corporations, are afforded self-regu-
latory powers to be exercised in the public interest.' 0'
An interesting self-regulatory experience can be found in the case of the BM&FBovespa
stock exchange segment called Novo Mercado, an institutional initiative aimed at fostering a
dynamic capital market through reinforcement of best practices of corporate govern-
96. See supra Section IH(C).
97. Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can
Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 127, 129 (David Moss
& John Cisternino eds., 2009).
98. Id.
99. Id, at 120.
100. Markets do not always produce optimal outcomes. This asks for a certain degree of government regu-
lation. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation, in GOvERNMENT
AND MARKETS, supra note 21, 13, 16-18 (Edward Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010).
101. Art. 1, VI, Regulamento, Resolufdo CMN N 2.690/2000, de 28 de janeiro de 2000 [CMN Resolution No.
2690/2000, Jan. 28, 2000], available at https://www3.bcb.gov.br/normativo/detalharNormativo.do?N=100016
877&method=detalharNormativo.
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ance.102 It was formed at the end of 2000 and is composed of companies that voluntarily
commit themselves to higher standards of corporate governance and disclosure than those
legally imposed both by corporate law and by regulations issued by CVM.103 Although
admission to the Novo Mercado is based upon a voluntary request by each company, once
an agreement of admission is signed between the company and BM&FBovespa, the re-
quirements of the listing segment are legally-binding.104
As is the case with other private regulatory regimes, the Novo Mercado was created after
it became clear that the desired outcomes-in this case, the improvement of best practices
of corporate governance-would not arise from legislative sources.' 05 After many at-
tempts to modify the Corporate Law to include rules that fostered investor protection and
allowed the growth of the capital markets failed, the private sector decided to take
initiative. 106
Created under the assumption that stricter levels of corporate governance, reflected
mainly in the one-share-one-vote rule and in requiring more information to be disclosed
to the market, would advance investor interest' 0 7 and benefit the performance of compa-
nies,108 it has so far attracted 125 companies, 109 most of them new publicly traded compa-
nies110 and not companies that migrated from BM&FBovespa's traditional listing segment.
102. BM&FBovespa, Novo Mercado: Governanfa Corporativa [Novo Mercado: Corporate Governance],
BM&FBovsSPA, 1, 3 (2009), http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/a-bmfbovespa/download/FolderNovo
Mercado.pdf. Apart from Novo Mercado that introduces the stricter degree of best practices of corporate
governance, BM&FBovespa carries two other listing segments of special corporate governance compliance
(Level I and Level 2), as well as the regular BM&FBovespa market. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 3-4.
104. See id. at 3.
105. Calixto Salomio Filho, Structural Analysis of Corporate Law: A Developing Country Perspective, in Busi-
NESS, MARKET, AND REsPONSIBILrY, supra note 31, at 1292.
106. Id.
107. In fact, studies show that better corporate responsibility performance leads to better access to financing.
See Beiting Cheng, Ioannis loannou & George Serafeim, Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Finance,
STRATEGIC MARKETING J. (forthcoming), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1847085.
108. BM&FBovespa, s.upra note 102, at 3. The assumption that stricter levels of corporate governance will
advance investor interest and benefit companies' performance has been deemed correct by recent studies. See
Leandro S. S. de Oliveira & David F. L. Santos, Desempenho e Volatilidade dos Indices de GovernanCa Corporativa
do BM&F BOVESPA [Performance and Volatility of the BM&FBOVESPA Indexes of Corporate Governance], I
REVISTA DE ADMINISTRAcAO, CONTABILIDADE E SUSTENTABILIDADE U. MGMT., ACCr. & SUS-
TAINABILrIY] 52, 52 (2011); Zoltin B. Geocze, Niveis Diferenciados de Governanfa Corporativa e o Efeito Sobre o
Risco de suas Af&es [Levels of Corporate Governance and the Effect on the Risk of its Shares], REviSTA DE FINANcAS
APLICADAS U. APPLIED FIN.] 1, 2 (2010). See also Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira, Lucas A. B. de C. Barros &
Rubens Fam~i, Atributos Corporativos, Qualidade da Governanfa Corporativa e Valor das Companhias Abertas no
Brasil [Corporate Attributes, Corporate Governance Quality and Value of Listed Companies in Brazil], 4 REviSTA
BRASILEIRA DE FINANCAS [BRAZILIaN J. FIN.] 1, 1 (2005) (although not based only on data related to compa-
nies listed on the Novo Mercado, it shows a positive and significant influence of corporate governance quality
on firms' market values); Antonio G. de Carvalho & George Pennacchi, Can a Stock Exchange Improve Corpo-
rate Behavior? Evidence fron Firms' Migration to Premium Listings in Brazil 18 J. CORP. FIN. 883 (2012) (indi-
cating that companies listed in the special segments of BM&FBovespa witnessed positive abnormal returns to
shareholders and an increase in the trading volume of non-voting shares).
109. In accordance with data available from BM&F Bovespa as of January 16, 2012. Novo Mercado [New
Market], BM&FBovEsPA, http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/cias-listadas/Empresas-Listadas/BuscaEmpresa
Listada.aspx?indiceAba=2&seg=NM&Idioma=en-us (last updated Dec. 29, 2012, 4:08 PM).
110. Gorga, supra note 4, at 449.
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Apart from increasing shareholder rights, such as exit rights and the amounts to be
received upon exiting, the Novo Mercado Listing Rules require companies to accept arbi-
tration as a conflict-resolution mechanism, which represents a faster and high-quality in-
strument for the investors." 1 Another distinctive feature refers to the enhancement of full
disclosure, which requires companies to provide more information to the market than
what is required by the Corporate Law.
The commitment to issue only voting shares, together with the duty to maintain a mini-
mum free float of 25 percent of the capital, is believed to make it more difficult for con-
trolling shareholders to maintain excessively high levels of ownership concentration,
thereby favoring both dispersion and strengthening of the capital market.
It is interesting to note that the self-regulatory experience of the Novo Mercado testifies
to the relevance of private regulation's effects and influence on public regulation. For
example, the public norms regulating the investment activities of pension funds set forth
different limits of equity investment by pension funds, which vary depending on the de-
gree of compliance of the invested companies with the corporate governance rules." 2
The higher the acquiescence with best practice rules by the company, the higher the per-
centage of the pension fund's resources is authorized to be allocated to it. Companies
listed on the Novo Mercado are so well-regarded that securities issued by them might an-
swer for up to 75 percent of a pension fund's assets, while the securities of a public com-
pany traded in the regular BM&FBovespa (i.e., one that duly complies with the Corporate
Law and the CVM regulations but does not adhere to higher levels of corporate govern-
ance) may account for only 35 percent of the pension fund's portfolio value." 3
This is a clear sign of the intersection between public and private regulation. It shows
the reliance of the state on private norm-setting and illustrates its positive impact on the
national regulatory framework. It leads to public awareness of the possible benefits of
self-regulatory measures that take its commitment to public policies concerning the rele-
vant regulated area seriously.
Such an experience also helps maintain the hope that an adequate and far-reaching
public regulation in Brazil might follow the norm-setting generated by private actors, as
was the case in the United States and the United Kingdom where self-regulatory measures
created the basis for a transparent market, which afterwards was thoroughly better struc-
tured through public initiatives as well." 4
B. FOSTERING THE PUBLIC INTEREST THROUGH A RELIABLE SYSTEM OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Given the strong role that a dependable corporate governance framework plays in the
growth of the economy, social development in general, and the improvement of capital
111. BM&FBovespa, supra note 102.
112. See Resoluqao CMN N o 3792/09, de 24 de Setembro de 2009 [CMIN Resolution No. 3792/09, Sept.
24, 2009], available at https://www3.bcb.gov.br/normativo/detalharNormativo.do?method=detalharNorma-
tivo&N=109082281.
113. Resoluoo CAIN N o 3792/09, art. 36.
114. Coffee, Jr., supra note 33, at 28-29, 82 (arguing that "the past could again become prologue," meaning
that the history of United States and United Kingdom could provide a hint on the advancement of market in
other countries).
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markets in particular, understanding the best techniques to organize a reliable system
should be one of the priorities of Brazilian capital market public policy.115
In fact, the explicit aim of the Brazilian Corporate Law was to create the necessary legal
framework for strengthening the capital market. According to the Eaposifjo de Motivos
(Explanatory Memorandum) of the Corporate Law," l6 the aim of advancing the capital
market was to be achieved based upon the principle of investor protection.1 7 A strong
capital market and respect for shareholder rights are, therefore, the two pillars of the
Brazilian corporate legal system.
Such a system might be organized through public and private regulation, as the grant-
ing of self-regulatory powers to the stock exchange denotes. Common to both public and
private regulation must be the ability to care for the creation of institutions capable of
assuring investor welfare and market credibility. Be they public or private, regulatory
instruments must pay attention to the vast list of stakeholders as well as to the objectives
of corporate governance regulation, which are far from being solely related to private
matters."18
If corporate governance systems are now composed of public, private, national, and
transnational norms, there is no uniform or sole set of rules regulating the subject. Con-
sidering the importance of the topic, such normative plurality might raise concerns, espe-
cially in what refers to the overall legal scheme alignment with the public interest of
consolidating a trustworthy and accessible capital market." 9
115. See id. at 68 (defending the protection of investor confidence as a priority of public policy, especially
because the stock markets can be seen as an instrument to foster economic growth).
116. Exposifdo de Motivos [Eplanatory Memorandum] is the document where the reasons for introducing a bill
and the purposes of the bill are explained. See Erposifdo de Motivos N' 196 [Explanatory Memorandum No.
1961, do Minist6rio da Fazenda [Ministry of Finance], 24 de Junho de 1976 June 24, 1976), T 4, available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/atos/leis/6404 Exposicao.asp.
117. In the original Portuguese, the relevant part of the Ea-posipio de Motivos n.' 196 [Explanatory Memo.
No. 196] read as follows:
O Projeto visa basicamente a criar a estrutura jurfdica necessiria ao fortalecimento do mercado de
capitais de risco no Pais, imprescindivel a sobrevivncia da empresa privada na fase atual da
economia brasileira. A mobilizag5o da poupanqa popular e o seu encaminhamento voluntirio para
o setor empresarial exigem, contudo, o estabelecimento de uma sistemitica que assegure ao acion-
ista minorit~rio o respeito a regras definidas e eqiiitativas, as quais, sem imobilizar o empresirio
em suas iniciativas, oferegam atrativos suficientes de seguranqa e rentabilidade.
See id.
118. The famous Berle-Dodd debate on the purpose of the public corporation indicates that while some
scholars argue that the company shall solely serve the interest of shareholders (shareholder primacy theory),
others believe that the corporation has a profit-making function and a social function (stakeholders' theory).
For the original arguments of each of the doctrines, see AA Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44
HA.Rv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Wbom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L.
REv. 1145 (1932). For an interesting critical approach of the shareholder primacy idea, see Lynn A. Stout,
Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1189 (2002). The Brazilian corpo-
rate legal system is based on the principle that the company shall be managed in the interests of a broad range
of constituencies (shareholders, workers, and the community where the corporate activities are performed).
This legislative option should inspire and work as a guide to all other sorts of corporate regulations.
119. For comments on the public interest in the regulation of capital markets in Brazil, see Sheila C. Neder
Cerezetti, Regulacdo do Mercado de Capitais e Desenvolvimento [Regulation of Capital Markets and Development],
REGULA4.AO E DESENvoLviMENTo [REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT] 190 (C. Salomao Filho ed., 2012).
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Indeed, the interface between private regulatory systems and state-issued law is espe-
cially challenging when it touches the public interest.120 With reference to private regula-
tion-including the private regulation of corporate governance-it is worth mentioning
that control over its legal effects is not only related to the necessary consensus among the
parties in charge of approving a new set of rules, but also to the protection of the overall
interests affected by private regulation, including the broad spectrum of the public
interest.121
A good criterion for dealing with the multiplicity of norm-setting in corporate govern-
ance might be related to the aforementioned indispensable attention to the ownership
structure of the market in which regulation is to be applied as well as to the effects on the
extension of investor protection that some specific governance arrangements may guaran-
tee. This means that an essential feature of corporate governance rules, be their origin
private or public, is their coherence with the patterns of the ownership structure of the
market where they are to be applied.
Taking the Brazilian scenario as an illustration, it must be recognized that, in spite of
very relevant structural changes, the dispersed ownership has not yet proved to be a real-
ity. This does not mean, however, that one may undermine the presence of some widely
held companies or the need for detailed studies regarding the adequate corporate govern-
ance framework to be applied to them. Consequently, the creation of regulations meant
to deal with the new actors should always take into consideration the singularities of the
highly concentrated corporate ownership structure common to the other players. The
thoughtful consideration of the ownership structure is hence a way of aligning the norms
to the two aforementioned public purposes of the corporate legal system.
The presence of widely held companies gives rise to a large number of new concerns.
In the absence of a definite and constant allocation of power in the hands of one share-
holder or a precise group of shareholders, the corporate system is faced with the challenge
of dealing with novel subjects as well as with matters which, although already previously
important, have, to date, proven difficult to address effectively. The first one, i.e., the
unprecedented matters, was illustrated here by the rules on hostile takeovers, while an
example of the second may be found in the mandatory election of independent direc-
tors.122 In both cases, comparative studies are useful to shed light on areas of major con-
cern and to provide possible responses to the questions likely to be raised in legal systems
that have already faced the emergence of widely held companies. 23
The aforementioned example of the takeover rules currently in force in Brazil speaks in
favor of the relevance of taking ownership structures into account when creating corpo-
120. See Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter, Introduction: Private Accountability in a Globalising
World, in RESPONSIBLE BusiNEss, supra note 9, at 1-3.
121. Glinsld, supra note 10, at 44.
122. The rules regarding a company's management gain importance when a definite and influential control-
ling shareholder is no longer in place. This subject has been investigated elsewhere. See Cerezetti, supra note
58.
123. As it is now well established, there is no worldwide useful governance practice, and no absolute legal
structures that could be considered adequate to every legal system. This conclusion is especially critical for
comparative studies, since being unaware of it may lead to conclusions and suggestions of transplantation of
legal arrangements that although useful in some countries may end up being detrimental in others. Conse-
quently, it is not herein argued that transplantation of arrangements should be put in place, but only that one
may learn from the experience of others.
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rate governance rules. Indeed, as detailed in Section I11(C) above, the "poison pills" pri-
vate regulation is not aligned with the public interest of advancing reliable capital markets
precisely because it completely disregards the specific characteristics of the Brazilian con-
centrated corporation environment. Instead of regulating the subject in view of this real-
ity, the private rules in force strengthen the position of the controllers, exacerbate the
unbalance and conflicts between the controlling and the minority shareholders, and pro-
mote distrust in the capital market as an investment option.
In view of these circumstances, it becomes clear that there is a misuse of the normative
authority by the companies that adopted the "poison pill" rules. Any sort of takeover
regulation, while trying to improve the mechanisms for investor protection during control
transactions, should be aware that the measures that enhance investor protection in com-
panies with widely held ownership are frequently not relevant, and even detrimental, if
applied in jurisdictions composed of highly concentrated corporations. 24
It should be noted that some of the countries that faced this same challenge ended up
adopting rules initially designed to deal with a mainly dispersed environment. This was
the case of continental Europe where the E.U. Takeover Directive corresponds, and to a
large degree, to some of the British City Code rules, even though, in contrast to British
listed companies, many Continental European companies have highly concentrated own-
ership structures. 12 5 This means that measures once envisaged to protect the investors of
widely held corporations were embraced by dissimilar systems, which in some countries,
has arguably led to undesired results, such as the entrenchment of controlling sharehold-
ers. 126 Given that the ownership patterns of Brazilian companies resemble some of their
continental European counterparts, Brazil should learn from their experiences while try-
ing to establish its own legal takeover framework.
This article has suggested that both the existing legislation and private regulation do not
fully protect stakeholders in any of the situations described above; neither when the trans-
action refers to the control of controlled companies, nor when it relates to widely held
firms.
Although extremely relevant, facing all aspects of public policy choices with regard to
takeover attempts and suggesting regulatory paths vis-a-vis takeovers is outside the scope
of this article and has already been articulated elsewhere. 127 The message to be conveyed
here is that any sort of corporate governance regulation-be it public, private, or hybrid-
can only be deemed accurate once it is aligned with the public interest of creating a trust-
worthy environment in which the broad array of interests embraced by the corporation is
protected. And this purpose is much more easily achieved if the design of the corporate
governance rules takes into consideration the ownership structure patterns of the place in
which they are to be applied.
124. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 1263-64, 1266, 1270 (arguing that the impact of corporate
governance arrangements is intimately related to the corporate ownership structure).
125. Ventoruzzo, supra note 30, at 168.
126. "What becomes unacceptable, however, is when rules that protect incumbents are either erroneously or
intentionally presented as designed to benefit minority investors." Id. at 172.
127. See Cerezetti, supra note 119, at 24, 27.
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V. Conclusion
The recognition of corporate governance as a consequential aspect for the provision of
adequate investor protection, the development of capital markets and the economy as a
whole, the fundamental differences between the governance arrangements that seem to be
useful to both controlled and widely held companies, and how to deal with such matters in
view of the increasing use of private regulatory measures have formed the cornerstone of
this paper.
The article has tackled some of the challenges posed by a special form of regulation,
namely, those created by private actors. The dissemination of public functions to private
authorities, especially through the assignment-both explicit or as an effect of the lack of
regulation-of law-making tasks is a move with global dimensions.
It was argued here that it is important to pay attention to corporate ownership struc-
tures, distinguishing between good governance practices for controlled and widely held
firms. This was considered to be of essential significance both for public and private
forms of regulation. Refusing to do so may avoid the benefits that an adequate environ-
ment of investor protection creates for the development of the capital market and the
economy as a whole.
Aiming at proving this, this article has drawn on the example of takeover regulation in
Brazil, in both its private and public expressions. It has shown that, although the Brazilian
law disciplines both voluntary offers to the acquisition of corporate control and the conse-
quences of a control sale, it lacks a hostile takeover rule. It was also argued here that this
absence was considered as reasonable until recently because widely held companies did
not exist in Brazil, consequently, hostile takeovers were impracticable. But the recent
changes in the concentrated ownership scenario, which hopefully will be enlarged in the
long-term, have brought about the need for an entirely new perspective on the matter,
along with detailed regulation capable of dealing with companies characterized by both
widespread and concentrated capital. In view of the lack of such regulation, private parties
have adopted rules of their own that have become known as "Brazilian poison pills" and
were, to a certain extent, inspired by the European Takeover Directive. But norms gener-
ated by private actors in this case have proved to be biased and have not worked in the best
interest of advancing a reliable capital market. In fact, this conclusion derives precisely
from the fact that such rules disregarded the ownership structures of the regulated compa-
nies, which were mainly concentrated, thereby reflecting arrangements created to be ap-
plied to widely held firms.
As a consequence, it has become clear that the privatization of norm-making capacities
in this case, in contrast to what happened in another important self-regulatory Brazilian
experience-namely, the Novo Mercado listing segment of the BM&FBovespa stock ex-
change-did not give rise to satisfactory outcomes, not because it was a manifestation of
private regulation, but because its purposes were not aligned with the public policy that
supports the regulated subject.
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